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The conutitut iona"'- practice of embodying in the fundamental
law of a state a declaration of the rights and liberties of the
individuals in that state, a practice so familiar to us living
under the constitutions of the United States as to be re£p.rded
almost as a matter of course, is distinctively American in
origin, and had its genesis less than a century and a half ago.
The famous Virginia Bill of Rights drawn up by George Mason and
adopted on June 13, 1776 by a convention of members of the old
Virginia House of Bicrgesses was the first embodiment of the
principle that certain rights of the individual are so sacred
that their inviolability should be secured in the^highest
expression of the sovereign will of the people.
The exajaple of Virginia in thus formally declaring certain
rights and liberties of the people to pertain to them and their
posterity as the basis and foundation of government was followed
in every one of the eleven states which adopted constitutions
follov/ing the resolution of the Continental Congress in May
(2)
1776 advising such action on the part of the colonies.
Never had the belief in the existence of inviolable personal
rights been so general as in the century preceding the American
Revolution, and nowhere had this doctrine received wider recog-
nition than among the American colonists. The principle of
(1) Scherger "The Evoltition of Modern Liberty." Cap VIII
.
(2) Thorpe "Araerican Charters, Constitutions and Organic
Laws .
"
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^
individual liberty, religious, political and personal, wao 30
fundamental in the political thought of that time and place that
the idea of guaranteeing this freedom by declaring it in the
basic lav7 of the government met with immediate and universal
approval and acceptance, not only in the subsequent state con-
stitutions, and the federal constitution in this country, but in
(1)
the constitutions of other countries ao well.
To say that the idea of constituting these fundamental rights
a part of the basis of government originated in the American
colonies in 1776, is not to say that the belief in the existence
of such rights originated then and there. The consciousness of
the existence of such rights, and even the formal declaration of
their nature and extent began centuries before, and extended
through a period during which the constitutional principles and
political philosophy from which these rights and liberties were
evolved and developed, underwent many radical changes.
The doctrine of individual rights free from interferences
or even destruction by the state was unknown to the political
philosophy of the Greeks and Romans, to v;hom the state was
absolutely sovereign. Nor does this principle find recognition
among the Romans or even in the middle ages, which knew individual
rights only in the shape of contractual relations arising out of
(2)
an interest in the soil. But in England certain customs and
(1) ^The French Declaration of the Rights of Man 1T93.
(2) Stubbs "Select Charters Illustrative of English Consti tutiong
L
History." p. 396.
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rules of the common law had from earliest timea afforded some
measure of protection for individuals aa regarded their personal
liberty and security, and the violation and destruction of such
liberty and security at the handa of the king arouoed that protea"
and resistance which finally culminated in the first formal
recognition of the rights of English subjects, the Great Charter
of King John in 1315.
In this^the earliest charter of liberties, is found the
model for many of the provisions of the Virginia Bill of Rights,
the prototype of all the others. The prohibition on excessive
fines and on cruel and unusual punishments is directly traceable
to Cap* 30 of the Great Charter; unreasonable seizure is
forbidden in effect in cap* 38; i:7hile the protection of trial
according to the la'v of the land was virtually embodied in
cap. 59. Other provisions of the Great Charter were adopted
by some Bills of Rights framed immediately after that of Virginiaj
and copied from them into their later constitutions, among which
provisions may be mentioned the as :urance of right and justice
(3)
without sale denial, or deferment, and the right of free
' (3)
egress from and ingress to the country.
These several guarantees embodied in the Great Charter were
(1) Stubbs "Select Charters Illustrative of English Constitutions
History." p. 396
(3) Magna Chart a. cap. 40.
(3) Ibid Cap. 43.
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repeatedly affirmed by later kings, only to be aa repeatedly
violated, until again solemnly declared by the people, thia time
through their repreoentati ves in Parliament, in the oecond fereat
charter of liberties, the Petition of Right to Charles I in 1638.
In this document the principal ground of complaint was the
violation of the due process of law provisions in the Great
Charter and the statute 30 Edw. Ill, through the application of
martial law in times of peace, and the unjust quartering of
soldiers and sailors upon the subjects.
(3)
In 1679 the Habeas Corx^us Act re-affirmed another
common law right which a century later ;vas regarded as of
fundamental importance by the framers of many of our American
Bills of Rights, though not found in the Virginia constitution
of 1776. Then, finally, in 1689 the English Bill of Rights,
declared upon the accession of William and Mary, in denunciation
of the abuses of the late King James II as a warning and guide
to the new rulers, still further increased the number of
individual rights thus established in England by formal declaration
Among the additional securities provided were the fundamental
rights of petition, of bearing arms, of free elections and of
(3)
freedom of speech and debates in the legislature.
(1) Stubbs "Select Charters." p. 515.
(3) Ibid. p. 517.
(3) Ibid. p. 533.
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In addition to the rights thus formally eata'olished by ',he
series of English constitutional documents, there were certain
other doctrines of the comraon law which every English subject
regarded a^ his birthright, and v/hich seemed of sufficient impor-
tance to the colonists to deserve embodiment in their enumeration
of inviolable rights. Some of these rights had indded always
been kept sacred in England by the crovvn, but others had been
repeatedly ignored, and all were the heritage of the colonists,
ajid were deemed worthy of the new protection which the written
constitutions were meant to guarantee.
Such then^were some of the sources from which the American
statesmen in 1776 derived their ideas of fundamental rights,
ideas in no sense, therefore, newly discovered or declared at
that time. On the contrary they were in the language of the
English Bill of Rights itself, "ancient rights", to which every
English subject had been entitled by the course of the common
law and the statutes.
But the American Bills of Rights contained still other
declarations which had not previously been embodied in any
charter^or petitions, and which were not recognized by the
common la^, the origin of which is traceable to a different
source, namely, the then recent emphasis and general acceptance
of the theory of natural law as developed in the worke of Milton,
JIarrington and Locke in England, and in those of eminent writers
of continental Europe, during thn seventeenth century.
The theory of natural law, originated almost five centuries
before Christ by Heraclitus and developed in Greece by the
Stoics and their successor 3 , «ould come to no fruition in the

birth of private ri^^ta in that period wh^n the sovereignty of
(1)
the state waa absolute. But the effect of this theory upon
the developoent of the doctrine of natural rights, two thousand
years later, ^hen political concepts ho.! raiically altered,
ira3 niost potent
.
In the philosophical theory of natural law as expounded in
the seventeenth century was esibodied the concept of inherent,
natural, inalienable rights appertaining to men as men, and
which no governn-ent could rightly abridge or destroy.
Mere than a century before the Anierican Revolution, Milton
had defined the purpose of goverrjnient to be the preservation of
the liberty, peace and safety of the people, and had declared
that all men are naturally born free, and that liberty of press
and of conscience should be respected. Developing this theory
still further Locke contended that men lost none of their
natural rights by entering into the state of society, but
surrendered so inuch only of their liberty a3 was absolutely
necessary to establish government.
These views, chainpioned by many noted publicists of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, vrere -^vell known to the^
leaders among the Ar.erican colonists, in whose temperaments th^-;^
a ready response, and -jyhose difficulties they seemed so
satisfactorily to solve.
(1) Scherger "The Evolution of Hodern Liberty." cap. !•
(3) Ibid ch. II.
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The Ha33achU3att8 Body of Liberties had as early aa 1641^^
contained a statement and guarantee of many of these rights,
and a century or more later James Otis, John A'iana and Samuel
Adams, filled with enthusiasm for the doctrine of natural law
/tights," had made this captivating theory the common knowledge
^ (2)
of the American colonists.
Inflamed with the memory of recent tyrannies and oppressions
dedicated to the terrible struggle they had just commenced in
behalf of their liberties, and conscious that even a democracy
furnishes no necessary guarantee of liberty, the colonists
almost inevitably accorded to the declaration of the nature and
purpose of government, and of the rights of liberty of conscience
speech and press so important a place in the structure of their
constitutions
.
Fnen, therefore, in 1818 the framers of the first Illinois
constitution were confronted with the problem of drawinr; up a
statement of the fundamental law for the nev; commonwealth, there
Was nothing novel, either in the doctrine of inviolable personal
rights and liberties, or in the practice of guafanteeing them
in the constitution by express enumeration. ITot only had all
of the eighteen state constitutions in force when Illinois
became a state^^ contained such a declaration of individual
rights, as had also the Declaration of Independence, and the
federal constitution, but in France as well had this principle
received effective recognition in the Rights of Man prefixed
(1) Stimson "Federal and State Constitutions of the U.S."
Rook II . ch . I
.
(2) Scherger supra ch . IX.
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.
(1)
to the conatitution of 1793.
Of the most immediate and determining influence, no doubt,
in shaping the Illinois Bill of Rights was the famous Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 under which, with but slight chancres, the
framers of the Illinois constitution were then living, and which
for thirty years past had been the organic law of the territory^
now about to be formed into a state. This Ordinance contained
six articles of com.pact of which the first two constituted
virtually a Bill of Rights, which though shorter and more
concise were practically as comprehensive as mar.y of the more
(2)
verbose declarations in the existing state constitutions.
The authorship of this celebrated Ordinance seems to be a matter
of dispute, but whether it was chiefly the work of Putnam, Cutletr
Dane, or Jefferson, or, what is more probable, a combination
of the ideas of them all, it unquestionably offered a more
natural and familiar model for the framers of the first Illinois
even the
constitution, than/Virginia Bill of Rights and its copies in
the other states which exerted a considerable influence as
well.
(1) Liefer "Civil Liberty and Self Government." p. 536.
(2) Thorpe "American Charters Constituions and Organic
Laws." Vol . 3, p . 957.
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(1)
Section I
The firat section of the Bill of Rights of the conotiution
of Illinois begins by declaring men to be by nature free ani
independent and to p03se33 these inherent and inalienable rights
v;hich occupied so important a place in the political philosophy
of the seventeenth century. The constitution of 1818 had declared
that "all men are born free and independent and have certain
inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty and of acquiring and
possessing and protecting property and reputation and of pursuing
their own happiness," using language very similar to that of
(3)
the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 and of the Declaration
(3)
of Independence in the sane year.
*
The assertion that all men are born equally free and inde-
pendent Was given further effect in this state by the prohibition
(4)
on slavery whereas in Vir^^inia this declaration was believed
(5)
not to apply to the negroes. Though property and reputation
were first included among the fundamental individual rights along
(1) All men are by nature free and independent and have certain
inherent and inalienable rights—among these are life, liberty
and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and
the protection of property, governments are instituted ajaong
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed'^ Constitution of Illinois, 1870 Art. II Sec. I.
(2) Constitution of Virginia, 1776, Bill of Rights, sec,
I
Thorpe, "American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws,"
p .3813.
(3) Declaration of Independence .par .2 .Thorpe sup r a . p. 4.
(4) Constitution of Illinois 1818, Art .Vi, Sec. I Thorpe p980
(5) Stimson "Federal and State Constitutions of the United
States, p . 21
.
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with life, liberty and the purauit of happineiiJ by the Haooachueet b
(1)
Body of Liberties (Preamble) in 1641, this broader enumeration
Was to be found in only one otate conatitution in 1813, namely
(3)
that of Pennsylvania 1790, from v;hich the whole of this section
in the Illinois constitution of 1818 was taken.
The essentially American doctrine of the sovereignty of the
people, and the principle of the basis and purpose of government
were declared in the words "all power is inherent in the people
and all free governments are founded on their authority and
instituted for their peace, safety and happiness," which had
been stated in precisely the same terms in the constitutions of
Indiana, 1816 and Pennsylvania, 1790, and in very similar
language in a number of the other state constitutions.
In the constitution of 1848 all these provisions were adopted
from the first constitution without the slightest change, though
the original committee report included in addition an express
declaration of the right of the people to alter the government
whenever the public good requires it; a provision found in the
original Virginia Bill of Rights and in the Declaration of
Independence, and upon the apparently self evident principle of
which rested the theoretical justification of both the English
and the American Revolutions.
In the constitution of 1870 the somewhat prolix statem.ent
(1) , Stimson, supra p. 20.
(2) Art. IX Sec. I
.
(3) In the proposed constitution of 1863, the convention adopted
the exact language of the Declaration of Independence, with
reference to these personal rights, addinc, however, the
right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property.
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of the earlior consti tutiona '.7aB abandoned for the concise
wording; of the Declar:\tion of Independence, with the addition of
the protection of property as one of the purposes of government.
A change in wording that aroused some opposition in the constitu
tional convention of 1869 was the unqualified declaration that all
men are by nature independent, in place of the modified form
"equally independent" contained in the former constitutions.
Several auggestions were made to alter this by adding qualifying
phrases or by striking it out altogether as being contradictory
to the real place of man before God and among his fellovmien, but
this absolute declaration of man's independence v/as retained,
though not found in the early constitutions, nor even in the
Declaration of Independence and contained in but three of the
thirty six other constitutions in force in 1870.
In Illinois, as has been seen, the assertion of man's
independence was never qualified by considerations of race or
color but extended in meaning, as it did in terms, to all men.
Liberty and property as used in the constitution have been
repeatedly defined by the courts in cases involving alleged
violations of the due process of lav/ provisions and may, ther efose,
best be considered in the discussion of the following section.

— i. fc*.
(1)
SECTION II
Section 3 contains the prohibiten against deprivation of life,
liberty, or p-operty without due proceDi of la"^ '.vhioh has proved
to be the moat effective guarantee of individual righto as
against the government, not only as interpreted and enforced by
the state courts but also as applied b/ the federal courts
under the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution.
The first constitution of Illinois declared that no freeman
should be imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or
privileges, or outla'ved or exiled or in any manner deprived of
his life, liberty or property but by the judgment of his peers
or the IccM of the land. This provision was virtually a copy
of chapter 59 of the Great Charter of King John of 1315 as
airi ended and affirmed by chapter 35 of the Great Charter of Henry
(3)
III, two years later, with the addition of the phrase, "'or
deprived of his life, liberty or property."
The second article of compact in the Northwest Ordinance of
1787 had also declared that no man should be deprived of liberty,
or property but by the judgment of his peers or the lav/ of the
land and similar provisions had been embodied in more than two
thirds of the state constitutions in force in 1818, though not
generally limited to freemen, a limitation probably retained
in the constitution of Illinois merely by oversight.
(l) "iTo person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. "Constitution of Illinoi s, 1870,
Art. II sec. 3.
(3) Stubbs "Select Charters" pp. 301, 346.
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ITo chanf;e was made in the wordinr: of this section until the
adoption of the present constitution, when the esaence of the
provision was embodied in the short statcrrient of the present
section copied from amendments five and fourteen of the Federal
constitution, the latter of which had been adopted but a year
before the constitutional convention of 1869 met in Springfield.
At that time about one third of the state constitutions still
retained the original form, "but by the judgment of his peers", -
which meant trial by jury and "or the laws of the land" - v/hich
' (1)
meant indictment and procedure at common law, - though a number
emplo^red its nov; famous equivalent "by due process of law". This
phrase appeared first in the Statute 38 Edward III, Chapter 3
and Was not found in any state constitutions prior to the
adoption of Amendment V in the constitution of the United States.
This constitutional guarantee of life, liberty and property
against deprivation save by due process of law has been expou:-ded
and applied in an enormous mass of cases in this state, as in
all the others, which it would be impossible to discuss in
detail, though a few general definitions may be helpful in
showing the remarkable scope of this apparently sim^ple provision.
"Liberty" as used in the constitution means not only freedom
from servitude and restraint, but also the right of every man to
be free in the use of his powers and faculties and to adopt and
(1) Stimson "Federal and State Constitutions of the
United States", p. 16.
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pursue such a vocation or cnlling a3 he iriay choose, subject only
(1)
to the restraint neceoaary to secure the conr.on v/elfare.
"Froper'-y" is not only the physical thing which may be the
subject of o'.mership, but al30 the right of dominion, possession
and po'.7er of disposition over it, and includes ac v/ell the ri ht
to acquire it in any lawful mode or by fol"" owing any lawful pursui||t
which the citizen in the exercise of the li'^erty guaranteed may
adopt .
The privilege of contracting is therefore both a liberty and
(3)
a property right within the protection of the constitution, a
doctrine which has caused the invalidation of a large number of
laws passed for the protection of laborers. A number of cases
deal with the question of what are "vest rights", as these
only are properly within the protection of this class. So for
(4)
example there is no vested right in existing rules of e-^ridence
(5)
nor to particular remedies and in general mere rights in
expectancy, as the expectancy of inheritance are not vested
(6) (7)
rights. Rights of action are, however, protectt)d as are
also accrued defences.
(1) Braceville Coal Company v. People 147 111. 66 (18 93^^
(2) Ibid .
(3) Frorer v. Peopl^ 141 111. 171 (1893)
(4) Meadowcr oit v. People. 165 111. 56 (1896)
(5) Smith V. Bryan 34 111 . 364 U864)
[•o) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." (Ed. 7) p. 512.
(7) Van Tuwa.-en v. Chicago 61 111. 31 (1871)
(8) Mc Duff ee v. Sinnott 119 111. 449 (1887)
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"Due proce.'33 of law" has been variously defined and varioaal
interpreted, but no definition can be at the aarrie time comprehen-
oive and accurate. It is aynonyrnous with "the law of the land"
and Cooley cites with approval the definition of thia latter
phrase siven by Webster in the jOartmouth College Case. "By the
"la'-v of the land" is most clearly intended the general lav/, a
law which hears before it condemns; '.vhich proceeds upon inquiry
and renders Judgment only after trial, '^he meaning is that every
citizen shall hold his lif e, lib-:'rty, property, and immunities
(1
under the protection of the general rules which govern society."
Very similar is the definition rriven by the Illinois Supreme
(3)
Court
.
Without examining in detail the different applications of
the requirement of due process it suffices here to mention that
it demands the equal protection of the laws, excluding unreason-
able class legislation, that i s, 1 egi slati ve discrimination not
(3)
based on reasonable differences, laws tending to grant
monopoly rights and the imposition of special bmrdens and
(4)
liability without just cause. In the judicial proceedings
themselves, it makes, above all, the requirement of competent
jurisdiction in the tribunal undertaking to affect the property
(5)
rights of individuals.
(l) Cooley ^Consti tutional Limitations." p. 503.
(3) Millet V. People 171 111. 399 (1398)
(3) Ibid .
Bessette v. People 193 111. 334 (1901)
(5) Bickerdike v. Allen 157 111. 95 (1896)
\\
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The moat important limitationa on the individual's right to the
undisturbed enjoyr.ent of his property, bedides the right to
eminent domain, and the taxing povrer, is the ao-callecl police
power of the state. But even this pov;er can be exercised only
within the bounds necesoary to pi^tect the public health safety
and comfort, and any interference beyond ':hat violates the
(1)
guarantee of due process of law.
(2)
Section III
Liberty of conscience and freedom of religious worship were
of course regarded by the American colonists as one of the most
essential of the inherent, inalianable rights of men, and the
religious persecutions in their mother country had profoundly
convinced them of the need of guar-^nt eeing this right against
governmental interference. Accordingly there is found in the
first constitutional declaration of man's rights viz., the
Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776, a guarantee of religious freedom
(1) Ruhstrat v. People 185 111, 133 (1900)
(3) "The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship, without discrimination shall forever be guaranteed;
and no person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege or capacity on account of his religious opinions;
but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be
construed to dispense with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts
of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of the state. No person shall be required to
attend or support any ministry or place of worship agai;^his
consent, nor shall any preference be given by law to any religiou
denomination or mode of worship."
Constitution of Illinois, 1870. Art. II Sec. 3.
.1
1
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notwithstanding that the' Anglican chur'ch v;aa then the established
ohurch of that comnonweal th . Similar guarantee3 of the liberty
of conscience and religiouo worahip -vere inserted into all the
subsequent constitutions adopted before Illinois became a
(1)
state, - with the single exception of Louisiana 1812, in
which state the prevailing religion wa^ that of the Roman
(2)
Catholic Church ~ and the first article of cor.ipact of the.
Northwest Ordinance declared that no person demeaning ^imself
in a peaceable and orderly manner should ever be molested on
(3)
account of his mode of worship or religious senti^ients.
In the first constitution of Illinois, the guarantee of
liberty of conscience and religion contained detailed provisions
taken from a number of different constitutions, relative to
the natural and indefeasible right to worship according to the
diet ate 3 of one's own conscience and the freedom from control
in that respect by any human authority; immunity from taxation
for the support of any place of worship or ministry; prohibition
on giving preference by law to any religious establishment or
mode of v/orship and a requirement that no religious test ever
be demanded a3 a qualification to any office in the state.
These provisions were all adopted ver^oatim into the constitutinn
of 1848, as also into the proposed constitution of 1832. In the
(1) In a number of the states, however, political equality was
assured to those only who professed the Protestant faith.
(2) The irrench Declaration of the Rights of Man had, however,
guaranteed the free exercise of religion. Rights of Han,
section 7. Lieber "Civil Liberty and Self Governr.ent" p. 537.
(3} Thorpe ''American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws,"
2 p. 960.
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convention of 184B the conir.ii tt ee reported a quial if i cation on
the prohibiton acainot being compelled to erect or si.ipport a
place of worship against one's cono??nt, by the addition of the
words "contrary to what he has deliberately and voluntarily
engaged to perform." This qualifying phrase, vvhich was found
in a number of the other constitutions, might have pro\''ed to be
of considerable importance had the state courts taken the same
view of the language of this prohibition, that the United States
Supreme Court did of the prohibition of the thirteenth
amendment of the federal constitution by which "involuntary
servitude" was held to mean personal service, involuntary at
time of performance even though voluntarily contracted for.
The section in the present constitution v/ith reference to
religious freedom and liberty of conscience is even more comprs-
hensive than that of the former constitutions, though in
substance quite similar. The added provision that "no person
shall be denied any civil or political right, privilege or
capacity on account of his religious opinions" had been reported
out by the committee in the convention of 1348, but was omitted
in the section as finally adopted. It was introduced to cover
both the matter of competency of v/itnesses as found in the Hew
York constitution of 1846 as well the then existing Illinois
provision as to religious tests as qualifications for office,
omitted in the present constitution.
The express limitation of the guarantee of liberty of
conscience so as to exclude the requirement of oaths or
affirmations and the commission of acts of licentiousness or
practices inconei stent v;ith the peace or safety of the State
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wao not found in the conati tution of 1848, though the then recent
trouble with the Mormons would have seemed to call especially
for such a rroviso at that time. In the convention of 1869
the introduction of this proviso, then found in over one third
of the existing constitutions, called forth considerable
opposition to its adoption on the ground that the proviso was
a)
inconsistent with the preceding guarantee of religious freedom.
The last sentence of the section vix., the prohibition on
compslling attendance on or support of any ministry or place of
worship, and on giving any preference by lav; to any religious
denomination or mode of worship presents no material change from
the earlier provisions on these points. In the convention of
1869 there were presented four petitions, requesting an express
constitutional protection of the right to observe the seventh
day of the week as the Sabbath, and an additional section
exempting persons who conscientiously observe the seventh day
as the Sabbath from answering civil process on that day, was
(2)
moved and adopted, but on reconsideration was struck out.
The Illinois cases construing this section of the const i tut ioWi
are few in number, but some ofthe general principles to be
(1) Debates of Convention of 1869 p. 1560.
(2) Ibid, pp. 1563, 1777.
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g.itliered from the construction of similar provisions in other
constitutions will show how the courts have in {general viewed
the protection embodied in such provisions. The express prohi bi ti^lns
of the section guarantee not only religious toleration, but
religious ^quality. They do not, however, prohibit the author^
ities from such solemn recognition of a superintending Providence
in public transactions and exercises as the general religious
(1)
sentiment of mankind inspires. Nor does the right of free
thinking and free speech justify blasphemy, or prevent its
punishment by the law, when uttered in a wanton manner with a
wicked and malicious disposition and not in a serious discussion
(2)
upon any controverted point in religion. Laws requiring the
observance of the Christian Sabbath are almost universally upheld
as not violating this constitutional provision, though ^ooley
(3)questions the entire soundness of that view.
In Illinois under the present constitution the right to
testify is included among the civil rights, privileges, and
capacities which al*e protected by this section against denial
by reason of religious opinions, though under the earlier
constitutions an atheist was, in accordance with the common law
(5)
rule, incompetent as witness. The oonstitution of 1870,
therefore, abrogated all restrictions as to the competency of
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations," p. 668.
(2) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations," p. 673.
(3) Ibid. p. 575.
(4) Ewing V. Bailey 36 111. App. 191. (1890)
(5) Central Military Tractte Railroad Comp any v. Rockfellow 17
111. 541 (185G) ~~
'

witneotiea on account of defect of religious belief.
(3)
Section 4
Liberty of speech and of the press, under certain limitations,
Was protected in England by the principles of the common law,
and considered essential to the nature of a free state. But in
England, for years before the American Revolution, there had
been serious invasions of this right, and in the American coloniec
(5)
there had never been any real freedom of speech or of the press.
In the seventeenth century Milton had in England championed these
liberties in his Areopar.i tica and the numerous appeals to
natural law ty James o^^'^ and John and Samuel Adams in the
American colonies all included them among the fundamental
(4)
individual rights. The Virginia Bill of Rights declared the
freedom of the press to be one of the great bulwarks of liberty
which could never be restrained, and in 1818 the federal
constitution and all the state constitutions but two viz., Nev;
Jersey, 1776 and ^ew York, 1777, contained similar provisions
as to freedom of the press, a number of them expressly protecting
also the liberty of speech.
(1) Hrouek v. People 134 111. 139, (1890)
(2) "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty,
and in all trials for libel, both civil and criminal, the
truth when published with good motives, and for justifiable
ends shall be a sufficient defence . "Gonsti tution of Illinois
1870, Art. II Sec 4.
(3) White "The constitution of Pennsylvania," Cap.V.
(4) Scherger "Evolution of Modern Liberty" Cap. IX.

In the firgt conotitution of Illinoio freedom of the press
•'.va9 guaranteed to all v7ho exanined the proceedines of any branch
of the government, this hateing been the point of attack by the
English government in the past, and to every citizen was
guaranteed the right to freely speak, write and print on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. These
provisions v/ore embodied v/ithout change in the constitution of
1848 and in the proposed constitution of 1863.
In the constitution of 1870 all but the last sentence was
omitted which contained the essence of the entire section, and
every one of the twenty six other state constitutions then in
force, guaranteed freedom of the press, which of course includes
freedom of speech, either to all persons, as is the case in the
Illinois constitution of 1870, or to all citizens as was done
in the earlier Illinois constitutions.
The establishment of truth when published with good motives
and justifiable ends, as a sufficient defense in all trials of
libel, both civil and criminal was inserted to protect more
specifically the liberty of press previously guaranteed in
general terms. In the constitution of 1818 it was declared
that in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating
the official conduct of officers, or of men acting in a public
capacity, or where the matter published is proper for public
information, the truth might be given in evidence, and that
in all indictments for lia^s^ the jury should have the right
of determining both the law a:-d the fact, as in other cases.
At common law, there had been an important distinction
i,
between civil actiona for libel, and criminal prosecutions for
the sane as to both of these provisions, vis., the admi saibility
of truth as a d-^^^ense, and the function of the jury in a trial
for libel. Wliile truth of the matter published '.vao always a
defense to a civil action for libel, since a man had no ri^ht
to a better reputation than his real character deserved, and
Was, therefore, not injured by any true fitatemsnt concerning
him, in criminal prosecutions for li^jel, the truth of the
matter published, bein^ rather a greater provocative to the
person libelled, to retaliate by acts involvinr^ a breach of
peace - which last consideration was the original basis of all
common law jurisdiction of crimes-could not be pleaded as a
(1)
defense. This rule as regards criminal libel was changed in
England by Lord Campbell's Act, 6 & 7 Victoria, Chapter 96,
and the provision in the Illinois constitution of 1818 expresses
in other terms the general form of the change in law admitting
truth as a defense when published with good motives and for
justifiable ends.
As regards the function of the jury in trials for libel, the
common law rule in civil actions left it to the jury, if the
words published were ambiguous, to decide whether or not they
were libellous, that is, to p-.ias on both the law and the fact.
(1) Chase's Black stone. Book III. Cap. VI.

The 3ame doctrine wa3 asserted in several early casea^s regardo
criminal proaiacuti ona for libel, but wao subsequently greatly
controverted, and was certainly an anomolous one in the criminal
(1)
law. But by the Fox Act of 1774 the jury nas permitted to
render a verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter
in issue, and thus act as judges both of the law and the fact
in criminal prosecutions also. The provisions in the Illinois
constitution, therefore, adopted the later statutory rule in
both of these regards as guaranteeing fundamental rights, as
had also previously been done in six other constitutions of that
time. The constitution of 1848 and the proposed constitution
186^^, both contained the above provisions without the
slightest change.
In the present constitution of Illinois, the truth^when
published with good motives and for justifiable ends ^ was made
a sufficient defense in both civil and criminal trials, re-
affirming the former provision as to criminal trials, and^also
placing the defendant in a civil suit under the same consti tutiana
protection. By 1870 the great majority of the other states had
inserted a constitutional provision like that in the Illinois
constitution of either 1348 or 1870. In the convention of 1869,
the newspEipers of the state sought additional protection in a
petition requesting an addition to the provision as to libel to
the effect that "it shall in all cases be incumbent upon the
plaintiff to prove malice", a change in the common law rule v/hich
(1) Chase's Blackstone, Boo^l III Cap. VI.
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miffht hay; proved a moot undeoirable piece of constitutional
(1)
legialntion and which was wisely rejected.
The provisions of the American Bills of Rir^hts on the
liberty of the press have been quite generally considered to
mean only that liberty of publication without the previobs
permission of the government, which was obtained by the abolition
of the censorship and not to the change the comr..on lav/ rules as
to responsibility for libel. Rut Cooley considers it to
include "not only liberty to publish, but complete immunity
from legal censure and punishm.ent for the publication so long
as it is not harmful in character when tested by the common
law standards in force when the constitutional guarantees
were establislied and in reference to v/hich the^^ have been
(2)
adopted," the phrase "being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty" meaning, therefore, subject to the common law
liability for defamation.
(1) At common law malice was conclusively inferred from the
falsity and defai'iatory nature of the charge, unless the
defendant established privilege of communication.
Ghase's Blackstone, p. 683.
(2) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations" p. 6G5.
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(1)
Section 5.
Of the concrste rights to which the ooloniots by reason of
their English descent laid claim, no longer aa English subject a,
however, but ac individuals in a state, one of the moat precious
and essential ^ao the right of trial by jury. This ancient
bul'-^ark of English individual liberty whose origin, according
to Blackstone, is to be sought as far back as the Saxon colonies,
though not firraly established until the abolition of V.-.e Saxon
trials by ordeal, and the Normal trial by battle, was first
formally declared by Magna Charta of King John in 1215 in the
king's colemn agreement that no freer.an should be hurt in
either his person or property, "unless by the legal judgment
of his peers or the law of the land." The chief grievance in
the Petition of Right of 1628 was the violation of this provision
and among the oppressions of King George III enumerated in the
Declarn.tion of Independence was that of depriving the colonists
in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury. Small wonder,
therefore, that every one of the constitutions of the revolu-
tionary period contained express guarantees of jury trial, a
precendent of constitutional practice which has persisted down
(l) "The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall
remain-' inviolate, but the trial of civil cases before
justices of the peace, by a jury of less than twelve men
may be authorized by law." Constitution of Illinois,
1870, Art. II, 95.
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to the latest constitutions, at least as regardB criminal
(1)
prosecutions for major offenses. Jury trial v/as also expressly
protected in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.
The Illinois constitution of 1818 contained the simple
provision that the right of trial by jury should remain inviolate
but in the constitution of 1848 there was added the stipulation
that it should extend to all cases at la'.?, without regard to
the amount in controversy, a provision not found in any other
st-.te constitution, in a n^-mber of which, indeed, there were
mentioned expres3 exceptions to the general requirement of jury
trial
.
The present constitution, though declaring that the right of
trial by jury her e tofore enjoyed, should remain inviolate,
adds that the trial of civil cases before justices of the peace
by a jury of less than txvelve men, might be authorized by law,
which is a direct reversal of the provision in the constitut ion:
of 1848, and had already been embodied in the proposed consti-
tution of 1863. This proviso, might it seoms, be regarded as
one ijranif estation of a growing conviction that the sacred and
time-honored trial by jury, however worthy of esteem and respect
(l) It is somewhat remarkable that in spite of the reverence of
the English for the jury trial, and the great emphasis
placed upon it by Blackstone and others, whoponsidered it
a right of vital importance, firmly established as a
constitutional principle cf English juri -:!prudence by the
Great Charter, the United States Supreme Court should have
declared that it ie, no part 6f "due process" as guaranteed
by Am.endment XIV of the Federal Constitution. Walker v.
Sauvinet 92 U.s. 90.
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by rea'-^on of its inportont role in the history of individual
liberty in the past, is not altogether above criticiam, ^nd
that whether b- reason of chan^^ad external conditionG, or
because of the manner in v;hich it hao coine to be administered,
the system of trial by jury demands substantial revi>3ion to
keep it from becoming moce and more a clog in the wheels of
justice. Considerable evidence of this feeling v/as found in
various motions relating to jury trial introduced in this con-
(1)
vention of 1869; one of which proposed to add that a concur-
rence of three fourths of a y^'-^V should in all cases constitute
a verdict. Several other less radical modifications were
offered, but one proposal went sc far as to authorize juries to
teturn a verdict of "not proven," after '7hich the defendant
might again be indicted for the sar.e offence upon additional
evidence being di covered.
The guarantee of jury trial "as heretofore enjoyed, " means
not as enjoyed in 1863 by statute, but as enjoyed by the common
law of England. This means that irycase of a person charged
with felony, "a jury of tr^elve men must be impanelled; the jury
must be indifferent between the prisoner and the people; they
must be summoned from the vicinage or body of the countf'y in
which the crime was alleged to have been committed; they must
unanimously concur in the verdict, and the court cannot interfere
to coerce them to agree upon a verdict against their convictions.
This right to trial by jury cannot be v;aived in case of felony
(3)
except by a plea of guilty, but in cases of misdemeanour the
(1) Debates of the Convention of 1869 pp.1567, 1568.
(2) George v. People . 167 111. 446 (1897)
(3) Morgan v. Peopl e. 156 111.151.

(1)
defendant may put himself upon the court for tirlal* This
guarantee extending only to cases in which jury trial was
required at common law does not extend to cases of contempt
proceedings, equity proceedings, statutory proceedings not known
to the common law, eminent domain proceedings etc., in which the
(3)
common law procedure was not applif^d.
(3)
Section 6
At common law the citizen was protected against seizure
of person of property by very strict rules regarding the issuing
of warrants, and immunity in his home against unreasonable
searches and seizures waa embodied in the maxim that "every man's
house is his castle." The desire of the colonists to protect
these tights Ty constitutional provisions is traceable in part
to the abuse of executive authority in England in violating these
rights in order to obtain evidence of political offences, which
(4)
practice was finally overthrown in 1765 by Lord Camden.
In the colonies themselves, moreover the practice of issuing
writs of assistance to the revenue offices, authorizing them to
(1) Darst V. People , 51 111. 386. (1869)
(3) 184 111. 475; 173 111. 144; 103 111. 367; 23 111. 202.
(3) "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no v/arrant shall
issue without probable cause, supported by affidavit,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." Constitution of Illinois/
1870, Art. II Sec. 6.
(4) Cooley, "Constitutional Limitations." pp.424 ff.page 424 ff.
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aearch suspected places at their discretion, had already caused
great dissatisfaction ten years before this date and had been
denounced by Otis as "the worst instrument of arbitrary pov/er,
the most destructive ibf English liberty and the fundar:ental
(1)
principles of law that ever was found in an English law book."
This prohibition of general warrants has been characterized as
the only constitutional principle to be first established in
(2)
America and later adopted in England.
The Virginia Bill of Righto of 1776 had contained an express
prohibition on general warrants of search and seizure which was
•ncorporated in the Constitution of IlDinois 1818 following the
declaration that thg^t people should be secure in their ^persons
houses, papers and possessions fron unreasonable searches and
seizures. Almost all of the other constitutions of 1818 contained
similar proMsions, and this section in the constitution of 1818
v;as retained without change in the constitution of 1848, at which
time all but four of the twenty-eight other constitutions
embodied similar provisions.
There was no alteration of this section in the constitution
of 1863, but the convention of 1869 changed the phr-aseology
somewhat by adopting verbatim the form of the fourth amendment
to the federal constitution. At the time of the frami ng ^s^'Se
present o©nstitution there was one state constitution only which
did not contain a similar provision, viz., Nev/ York 1846, which
(1) Gooley, "Constitutional Limitations." pp. 424 ff.
(2) Stimson "Federal and State Constitutions of the
United States." p. 149 n.lO.

still continued under the constitution in force in 1348, when
the prior Illinois constitution W3.8 adopted .
The purpose of this conati tutiona.1 prohibition was to
establish the couimon lav; as to searches and seizures, which had
always been extrem-ely jealous of the right of the individual^
to immunity from such interference with his person and property.
Unreasonable searches and seizures are those without warrant
properly obtained in cases where the comrion law required them.
Rut atrests without warrant are not abridged by the constitution
where such arrests could be made at common law before its
adoption. Probable cause must be shown by the production of
evidence satisfactory to the court of such facts as to convince
(3)
the magistrate that the suspicion is well founded, and to
justify the issuing of a warrant the affidavit must state either
that the person therein described cormitted the offence or that
the person making the complaint has just and reasonable grounds
to suspect, or does in fact suspect that he is guilty of the
(3)
offense
.
(1) north v. People 139 111. 81 (1891)
(2) White V. Wag;ar 185 111. 195.
(3) Housh V.
.
People 75 111. 487 (1874)
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(1)
Section 7,
The provision that all persons shall be bailable by oufficiart
sureties except for capital offences v/here the proof is evident
or the presumption great represents in effect the common law
(2)
rule of England as to bail. Since by the concept of the
common law every man was regarded innocent until proved guilty,
it followed also that every man was to be treated with all
possible leniency even after arrcb't for crimes and that con-
finement in jail should not be resorted to if the appearance
of the accused for trial could be assured in some other way«
Hence at common law every man was entitled to be released on
bail before conviction upon sufficient sureties except for
Capital offences on charges based on more than a mere suspicion,
when indeed the public welfare demanded the highest surety viz.,
the custody of the accused himself.
Though the first American Bill of Rights contained no
express guarantee or the right to bail, it was impliedly
guaranteed in the prohibition against requiring excessive bail,
which had been forbidden in England bf Statute 1 W. and M. 2,
Chapter 1, and in the Northwest Ordinance it had been declared
that all persona shall be bailable unless for capital offences
where the proof is evident or the presumption great.
(1) "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident
or the presumption great; and the privilege of the writ
0^ habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or inifasion the public safety may
require it." Constitution of Illinois, 1870. Art II
Sec. 7.
(2) Chase's Blackstone p .1001 .
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The first constitution guaranteed the right to bail in the
terms which have been retained in all three of the later
(1)
constitutions. About one half of the constitutions then in
force contained similar express guarantees of the right to bail
and most of the others impliedly guaranteed it by such provisions
as the ones adopted in the Virginia Bill of Rights.
Closely connected with the guarantee of bail is the guarantee
of the writ of habeas corpus, which was another common law right
of English subjects and was re-affirmed in the Habeas Corpus Act
(2)
of 1679, This writ which secured to the individual a hearing
as to the legality d his imprisonment and which was* and is,
characteristic of the English law alone, was regarded as one
of the most important of individual rights, and the Habeas Corpus
Act as the "second Magna Chart a and stable bulwark of liberties."
In England the privilege of this writ could legally be
suspended in cases of evident necessity, but only upon authority
given by Parliament to the Crown. The possibility of such an
exigency was provided for in the first Illinois constitution by
the provision qualifying the prohibition of suspending the
(1) Illinois is the only state that has no prohibition or
excessive bail. Stimson, supra P . 105.
(2) Stubbs "Select Charters." p. 517.
(3) "There i s on the continent nothing corresponding to the
constitutional right of any individual when arrested by
an officer of the governinent to demand instant information
of the cause of his arrest and to be set at large unless
indicted ]y a grand jury for a crime not bailable or for i
which the person accused is unable to give satisfactory
bail." Stimson "Federal and State Consti tutiolis" p. 18.
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writ viz., "unless when in casea of rebellion or invasion the
public safety may require it."
In the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 the inhabitants of the
Territory had been declared to be always entitled to the benefits
of the writ of habeas corpus, and provisions were found in 1318
in over half of the other state constitutions similar to the one
in the first Illinois constitution, which was retained without
change in the subsequent constitutions of the state.
(1)
Section 8
The protection against criminal prosecution except after
indictment by grand jury that is, formal accusation by a body
of from twelve to twenty-three sworn men of the c.ov>iaty extends
even farther back in English criminal procedure than does the
right to trial bv petit jury and has been traced to the Hundred
(2)
Courts of Aethslred. At common law indictments or presentments
by grand jury, ^vere required in all cases, though for raisdemeanoui
the method of accusation by information was used as well,
especially in cases of misdemeanors that tended to disturb or
endanger the government. But this latter species of proceeding
was looked upon with great disfavor in England because of its
ab^se in the times preceding the revolution, and was there later
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence,
unless on indictment of a grand jury except in cases in
which the punishment is by fine or imprisonment otherwise
than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment and in
cases arising in the army or navy or in the militia when
in actual service in time of war or public danger:
Provided, thrit the grand jury may be abolished in all cases.'
Constitution of Illinoi s, 1870, Art . II. Sec .8
.
(2) Stir<3on "Federaland State Constitutions" p. 169 n.
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(1)
regulated ly statute. In America aloo this accusation by
information v/aa very unpopular, though only one of the revolu-
tionary constitutions viz., ITorth Carolina 1776, contained any
other guarantee of indictment by grand jury than that contained
in the provision establishing the Engli,3h common lav/ as the law
of the states.
Wlien, however, the first constitution of Illinois came to
be framed, the Federal constitution had expresoly guaranteed
the right to indictment, and seven other states had followed
this precedent in their constitutions. The Illinois constitution
of 1818 provided that no indictable offence should be proceeded
against criminally by information, a principle that went beyond
the common law rule which r^^cognized some kinds of offences
that could be proceeded against by either indictment: or infor-
mation. The exceptions recognized in the constitution of 1818
were the same as existed at common la"', namely, trial by court
martial, and bv impeachment, to which proceedings the require-
ment of grand jury indictment never applied.
In the constitution of 1848 indictment or presentment of
a grand jury was required for all offences punished with imprison-
raent or death or fine above one hundred dollars, except in cases
of impeachment or cases arising in the array or navy or in the
militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger.
Similar provisions existed at that time in all but eight of the
state constitutions, and of these eight, six were still the
early constitutions adopted before the first Illinois consti tutioiil
(1) Chase's Blackstone Cap. XXI.
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Of the two others, one wae that of the civil law state of
Lcui3iina> and thfj other was that of Virginia which had retairied
its original Bill of Rights of 1776 in its second consti tutior.
.
It appears, therefore, that the indictment by grand jury
cawe to have growing importance in the American Rills of Righfe
in the thirty years between the framing of the first and second
Illinois constitutions, and in the proposed constitution of
Illinois of 1862 there was embodied the same guarantee.
But in the Illinois convention of 1669 there was evidenced
considerable opposition to the grand jury system. Some motions
suggested a reduction in the total number of grand jurymen, or
in the nunber required for a finding, and some advocated the
abolition of the grand jury with power in the legislature to
re-eststbli sh it, while others, more extreme, went to the length
(1)
of demanding complete abolition. Several speeches in
strong denunciation of the evils of the grand yary system were
(2)
delivered while others as warmly defended it. The agitation
terminated finally in the proviso now found in section eight
to the effect jrhat the grand jury may be abolished by law in all
Cases, leaving the advisability of abolishing this ancient
system to be determined b/ legislature, which that body in the
forty years since the authority v/as conferred upon it has not
(3)
seen fit to do. It is interesting to note that of the twenty
(1) Debates of the Convention of 18S9 p. 174.
(2) Ibid pp. 1434-1438, 1440-1442.
(3) Recent evidence of continued opposition to the grand jury
system is furnished by the introduction into the two last
sessions of the Illinois legislature of bills to abolish .
the system.
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four 3tate constitutions which in 1370 expresGly guaranteed
indictnient by grand jury, Illinoi.i v/as the only one that permittee
it to be abolished by the legislature, although Indiana
which, however, had not expressly protected it, had in 1R51
(1)
adopted a similar provision.
In Illinois under the present conatitution v/hat v;as practical
the conimon law rule as to grand jury indictment is confirmed.
Indictment is essential to the legal prosecution of persons
(2)
charged with crime .puni shable by penitentiary imprisonr. ent,
and where conviction would result in disqualification to hold
(3) (4)
public office, but no to hold persons to answer for misdemeanor
The proviso at the end of the section Virtually authorizes the
legislature to change a constitutional provision, but that its
effect is not, as night at first appear to be the case,
to nullify the whole section would seem to be shown by the
reluctance evidenced by the subsequent legislatures of this
state to alter a system which the constitution of tho state
evidently wished to favor.
(1) Constitution of Indiana, 1851 Art. Vii Sec 17.
(2) Paulsen v, P_epp.le 195 111. 507 (1302)
(3) Peop le V, Ripley , 171 111. 44 (1897)
(4) Brewster v. People 183, 111. 143 (1899)
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(1)
Saction 9.
The rights of the accused in criminal proseoutiono guaran-
teed bythig section, were for the' mo3t part rights to v;hich
English subjects were entitled by the con:non la'^v and which v;ere
considered essential attributes of personal liberty and security.
So at common lav; an indictment could not be tried unles3 the
defendant personally appeared. So also the defendant was
entitled to the assistance counsel as to the matters of law
arising on the trial. As to other matters the defendant was
not entitled to cotinsel, on the principle that the judge should
be counsel for the prisoner and see that the proceedings against
himwere legal and strictly regular. Rut Blackstone rightly
speaks of this latter rule as "not at all of a piece with the
rest of the humane treatment of prisoners by the English law"
and states that the judges never scrupled to allow a prisoner
the assistance of counsel to instruct him what questions to
ask or even to ask questions for him, with respect to natters
(2)
of fact.
(1) "In all criir.inal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel;
to demand tns nature and cause of the accusation and to
have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have process to compel the attendance o^ witnesnes
in his behalf and a speedy public trial by an impartialjury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed." Constitution of Illinois
1870 Art. II Sec. 9. '
(2) Chase's Blackstone p. 1025.
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When the prisoner was arraigned, the indictment, which
contained in great detail all ipattera bearing on the accusation
Was read to hin that he niight fully understand his charge, which
v/as all that was necesoary at a time when the general inability
to read, especially among the criminal classes, made a require-
ment of a copy for the defendant superfluous.
The right to meet the v/itnesses for the prosecution, and to
question theiajvas also a xmmon law right, though the defendant
had no right by the early rule to introduce witnesses in his
(1)
own behalf in capital cases. But by Statute 1 Ann. 2 ch. 9
it Was declared that in all cases of treason and felony all
witnesses for the prisoner should be exanined upon oath in like
manner as the witnesses against him. Finally the right to a
trial by a jury of the county where the fact was committed wac
also recognized by the comirion la.vi and insisted upon as one of
the greatest protections for the accused, based on the early
theory that the jurors were witnesses, and themselves cognizant
of the commission or non-commission in their midst of the act
charged.
The Virginia Bill of Rights enumerated substantially all
(2)'
of these rights of the accused and all but three of the
constitutions in force when Illinois becarrie a state contained
(1) Chase's Rlackstone p .1028 .
(2) Ga. 1798, II. J. 1776, S.C 1776.

-40-
expreaa proviaiona of a Similar nature. T;-.e firjt conoti tuticn
of Illinoia declared the righta of the accuoed in pri-ctically
the same terms found in the present constitution, and no
material change was rriade in the aecond conati tuti on . The ri^ht
ofydefendant to conpel the attendance of vdtneasea inhia favor
had been protected in two thirds of the consti tutiona then in
force. The present constitution contains the additional proviaon
that the accused have the right to a copy of the accusation,
a right guaranteed in nine other constitutions in force in 1870.
In the constitution of 1869 it was suggested to guarantee to
the defendant t;.e right to have his counsel close the argument
to the :ury, and also to make non-free-holders incompetent
as jurors, if objected to on that ground, but otherwise no
changes in the provisions of th'~ former constitutions were
proposed.
The provisions of the present constitution, like the
requirements of the common la'vV in this respect, refer only to
ni si prius trials, that is, not to appeals; or other proceedings
(1)
of review in higher courts. The presence of the accused,
though essential in cases of felony, is not necessary at the
(2)
trial of mers misdemeanours, and mayi in this latter case
be Waived by him.
(1) Field en v. People , 138 111. 595 (1889)
(3) Rloomington v. Heiland 67 111. 378 (1873)
.
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The right to appear by counsel includes the right ^ to ha^^
one's counsel allowed a reasonable time for argument.
The purpose of requiring a copy of tl^e accusation io to
oecure such specific designation of the offence charged as to
enable the defendant to prepare fully for his defence and to
plead the judgment in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the
same offence.
The right to meet the '.Titnesses face to face excludes all
evidence by depooition in criminal trials, with the single
(5)
exception of dying declarations.
The right to a speedy trial guarantees against arbitrary
and oppressive delays only, not 8uch/a3~lire due to congestion
(4)
^
of cases on the docket, and the requirement of a public trial
is not violated when the doors of the court room are closed for
a temporary purpose during the trial of a criminal case if not
(5)
for the purpose of excluding anyone connected with the trials
The guarantee of an impartial jury means a jury impartial in
(6)
the sense in which that term was understood at cor.ir.on lav/, that
is chosen under the safeguards with which the common law surro^nd<
(7)
^
the choice of jurors. Finally the requirement of a jury of the
(1) White V. People , 90 111. 117. (1878)
(3) West V. People. 137 111. 189. (1391)
(3) Starkey v. Peop le, 17 111. 17. (1855)
(4) Weyri
c
h v. People , 89 111. 90. (1878)
(5) Stone v. People 3 111. 336. (1840)
(6) Coughlin v. People 144 111. 140 (1893)
(7) See Chase's Blackstone. Cap. XXV.
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county or district may be waived 'cy the defendant by asking a
(1)
change of venue.
(2)
Section 10
In the sme catagory with the rights of the accused protected
in the preceding section is the freedom from self-incrimination
and from double jeopardy, iThich was also carefully protected
by the rules of the common law. Firstly, it was an established
rule of evidence at common law that confessions were not admissibl s
as evidence unlesij they were freely given without fear of harm
^r hope or favor, and a confession obtained by compulsion, though
used when the trial by ordeal and other inquisitorial trials
were still in force was not admissible in the later common law
(3)
prosecution of crimes. Says Cooley "A peculiar excellence of
the common law system of trial consists in the fact that the
accused is never compelled to give evidence against himself."
So also of the protection against double jeopardy, Blackstone
says it is a "ttniversal maxim of the common law of England
that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more
than once for the same offence, " and in every case the defendant
might plead former jeopardy in bar of the accusation.
M Weyrich v. People 89 111. 94 (1878)
(2) "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give
evidence against hiir.self or be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offence," Constitution of Illinois, Art. II
Sec. 10.
(3) "constitutional Limitations." Cap» X 442.
(4) Chase's Blackstone p. 1019.

The guarantee againot being compelled to give evidence
againat onoaelf wati put into the Virginia Bill of Rights and
into all but four of the other constitutions in force prior to
1818, including the federal constitution . Put the protection
against double jeopardy was found in only one half of those
same constitutions, not having been inserted into the prototype
of the early Bills of Bights. In the first Illinois constitution
both of the ^^e provisions were embodiecfi and they have remained
in the same ternis down to the present consti tution, being adopted
H»byy^he convention from the foriner constitutions without comment.
Both guarantees exi:3ted on almost all the other constitutions
in force in 1870
The constitutional protection against self-incrimination
means that neither a witness nor the defendant in a criminal
Case need answer any question the answer to which will expose
him to any penalty, fine, forfeiture or punishment, or which
will have a tendency to accuse him of any crime or misdemeanor
or to ez'cpose him to any penalty or forfeiture or Y/hich would
be a link in a chain of evidence to convict him of a criminal
(1)
offence. But this privilege is personal to the witness
(3)
and he may waive it without consent of the defendant. Furthermore,
this constitutional privilege cannot be claimed if ty reason of
an immunity statute the evidence obtained under compulsion can
(1) Lam son v. Boyden 160 111. 613 (1896)
(3) Sajnuel v. People 154 111, 379 (1897)
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in no Way be used as a basio in aid of a prosecution which
(1)
might result in fine, imprisonment, penalty or forfeiture.
The protection against double jeopardy means that no
person shall twice be put in peril of conviction for the some
(3)
act and offense, and whether two indictments are for the
same offense must be determined by an inspection and comparison
(3)
of the indictments. If the facts charged in the second indictmer||t
would have sustained conviction under the first indictment, the
plea of former jeopardy IjS good, but where the facts charged
in the second indictment would not, if proveol, have warranted
conviction under the first, the plea of former jeopardy cannot
(5)
be maintained.
The verdict itself forms a bar to Gubsequent prosecution
(6)
for the same offense though there is no judgment on it, but
where judgment of conviction is arrested or reversed at the
instance of the accused he will not in legal contemplate have
been in jeopar^iy, but may again be put on trial for the same
(7)
offense
.
(1) People V. Butler St. Foundry 20, 111. 336 (1903)
The immunity clause in the act here in question was
as follows:- "PROVI DED that no corporation etc shall
be subject to any cfiminal prosecution by reason of anything
truthfully disclosed by the affidavit required by this act
or truthfully disclosed in any testimony elicited in the
execution thereof." 301 111, p. 343.
(3) Fr eel and v. People 16 111. 380 (1855)
(3) Durham' v. People 5 111. 172 (1843
(4) Ibid'^^
(5) Gued'el v. People 43 111. 336 (1867)
(6) Hankins v. Peopfe 106 111. 638(1883)
(7) Gerhard v. People 4 111. 362 (1842)

-45-
So al30 if the jury ia discharged in case of di QacreeiT:ent, the
(1)
former jeopardy will not be available as a plea to a nev; trial*
When the sane act constitmtes several offenses, trial and
punishment for one will be no bar to a prosecution for the
(3)
Others growing out of the same transaction. So for instance
where one single act violates a local ordinance, a state law
and a law of the United States there are three distinct offenses
which are punishable as such. Similarly in case of an act
which is both a contempt of court and an indict ablejcrime, the
indictment and the proceeding for contempt are entirely distinct
(3)
and neither will be a bar to the other-.
(4)
Section 11
.
Of the three provisions in the next section, the first
one, requiring that all penalties shall be proportioned to the
nature of the offence, can be found in England as early as Magna
Charta, where it is declared that "a freeman shall not be a^nerced
for a small offence, but according to the degree of the fault
(5)
and for a great crime in proportion to the heinousness of it".
The spirit of this prohibition was expressed in the early America!
constitutions either b/- a provision like that in the English Bill
(1) Dryer v. People 188 111. 4C (1900)
(2) Trausch v. Cook Co. 147 111. 534 (1893)
(3) Reattie v. People 33 111. APP • 651 (1889)
(4) "All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
of the offense, and no conviction shall work corruption
of blood or forfeiture of estate; nor shall any person
be transported out of the state for any offense committed
within the same." Constitution of Illinois, 1870. Art. II Seqll
(5) Magna Charta, Cap. 30 Stubbs "Select Oharter s"p .399
.
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of Rights against oxce33iv'i fines and cruel and unusual punish-
U)
ment, found in th© Virginia Rill of Rights and in the federal
constitution, or by a requirement that all penalties shall
be proportioned to the nature of the offence, as in the Illinois
constitution of 1818. In one or the other of theae two forms
this eatly provision of Magna Chart a existed in over half
the constitutions in force in 1818 and Articled of the Northwest
Ordinance had provided that "all fines shall be moderate and no
cruel or unusual punishments shall be inflicted."
The second provision, to the effect that no conviction
shoul! work corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate, is
directed against the common law rule that descent could not be
traced through a person convicted of treason or felony, and
that his real and personal property were, therefore, forfeited,
the former to the lord of the fee, the latter to the king.
These incidents of treason and felony prevailed from the earliest
time, and had their source in the feudal theory that property,
especially realty was held of a superior lord Upon the
condition of discharging duties attaching to it, and was for-
(3)
feited by breach of these conditions.
This prohibition was not found in the earliest Bill of
Rights nor in the fedal constitution and when the first Illinois
constitution was framed, only three other constitutions contained
the prohibition exactly, though four others contained it in
(l) This prohibition had already been anticipated in the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, clauses 43, 45 and
46 Stimson "Federal and State Coiiatitions, " p. 33.
(3) Stephen "History of the Criminsftl Law of England. V.l p. 487,

-47-
modified form.
The last provio-^on in thia section forbidding deportation
for crime committed wi'-hin the state wao necejaitated by the
English statutes just prior to the American Revolution, making
deportation a substantive punishment. The punishment was
unknown at common law, and in 1679 the Habeas Corpus Act had
forbidden the deportation of English subjects as prisoner 3 out
(1)
of the kingdom. It was introduced as a condition of patdon
(3)
in Case of crimes excluded from clergy and by reason of
statutes passed in eighteenth century, had become part cf the
law of the colonies upon their separation from England. This
provision was, however, very rcire in the early constitutions
and in 1818 only three of the eighteen then existing state
(3)
constitutions contained such a prohibition.
All three of the above provisions were adopted in the
constitution of ].348, though the committee on the Bill of Rights
omitted all mention of the first two in its report. In the
constitution of 1870 these same stipulations were retained
without change, though it was sug.^^ested among other changes
to add that the death penalty should never be inflicted.
The question whether the imposition in a particular instance
of a punishment, though authorized by the legislature, violates
the requirement that penalties shall be proportioned to the
(1) Stubbs "Select Charters," p. 53.
(3) Stephen, supra pp . 480, 487.
(3) Mississippi, 1817, Ohio, 1803jVermont 1793.
(4) Debates of the Convention of 1869 p. 1573.
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nature of the offence, is of course, left to the diacretion
of the court. But it 13 a diocretion to be judicially exercised
and there may be caaeo in which a puAlshment, thou£;h within the
limits fixed by a statute, is so clearly excessive a3 to be i:.
(1)
violation of this constitutional requirement.
But whether the penalty imposed ty statute on a crime is
excessive per se, is a matter primarily for legislative discretion.
When the legislature has authorized a designated punishment for
a specified crime, the court will not hold it invalid, unless it
is a cruel or degrading punishment not known to the common law
or a degrading punishment which had become obsolete in the
state prior to the adoption of its constitution or is so wholly
di sproportioned to the offence as to shock the moral sense of
(3)
the community.
An act imposing tbejf orf ei ture of all franchises of a
corporation as a penalty for any violation of the prohibition
of the act on discriminating freight rates was held to contravene
(3)
this provision of the constitution. But providing an increased
penalty for a second offence is not imposing a disproportionate
(4)
penalty, for repetition of the offence aggravates the guilt.
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." p. 471.
(3) People V. Illinois State Reformatory 148 111. 413 (1SS4)
(3) C & A. H. R. Co . V. People 57 111. 11. (1873)
(4) Kelly v. People 115 111. 583. (1886)

Section 12«
Imprisonment for debt waa one of the great defects of the
common la'v from the earliest time 3 until well into the nineteenth
century in England, an:! existed in most of the American colonies
for many years, thour/n somewhat mitigated by insolvent laws. But
the absurdity and injiustics of imprisoning honest debtors was
pretty generally teal i zed by 1776, when the first American
constitutions 'vere being framed, and seven of the state constitu-
tions in force when Illinoig became a state embodied a prohibition
against imprisonment for debt, in the absence of fraud, as one
(3)
of the guarantees of individual liberty. The constitution
of 1848 and the proposed constitution of 1862 retained this
provision from the earliest constitution, and no change was
made in the section when adopted into the present Illinois
constitution,
This constitutional guarantee is confined to actions upon
contract*^* express^mpli ed, and does not apply to liabilities
for totts nor to fines or penalties arising from a violation
(1) "No person shall be imprisoned for debt unless upon
refusal to deliver up his estate for the benefit
of his creditors in such manner as shall be
prescribed by law or in cases where there is strong
presumption of fraud." Constitution of Illinoi s, 1870,
Art. II, Sec. 13.
(2) This principle had already been embodied in the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, 1641, in the
provision that no man should be imprisoned for
debt if the law could find competent means of
satisfaction otherwise from his estate. Stimson
"Federal and State Constitutions," p. 33.
(3) Rich V. feople 66 111. 513 (1873)
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(1)
of the penal laws of the State, and a court ca. not conirnit
for contempt in not obeying a decree to pay money unlesj the
(2)
refusal is wilful and not cauaed by financial liability.
(3)
Section 13.
The right of eminent domain, that is the power of the state
to appropriate to its own use or to that its agents private
property of its citizens needed for public purposes, is
inherent in sovereignty and is as old as government itself. In
early times, moreover, the duty of the state to cor.pensate the
individual for property so taken, waa not recognized, and even
in England private property was frequently taken for the use
(4)
of the crown without compensation. But Blackstone in discusang^
the limitations on the absolute right of private property
declares that the legislature alone can act in the exercise
of the power of eminent domain and that only by giving the
individual, so deprived, a full indemnification and equivalent
(5)
for the injury thereby sustained. Eminent domain differs
from taxation, in that i n the former case the citizen is compelled
to surrender to the public something beyond his due proportion
for the public benefit. It is a primary requisite, therefore.
(1) Kennedy v. People 123 111. 649 (1887)
(2) Blake v. People 80 111. 11 (o875)
(3) "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation. Such compensation, when not
made by the State shall be ascertained by a jury, as shall
be prescribed by law. The fee of land taken for railroad
tracks, without consent of the owners thereof shall remain
in such owners subject to the use for which it is taken."
Constitution of Illinois, 1870 Art. IT Section 13.
(4) White "Constitution of Pennsylvania" Cap .XXVI
.
(5) Chase's Blackstone p. 79,
V{
I
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in the appropriation of lands for public purposes that comp en-
CD
fiation shall be made therefor.
A3 thio pov;er of eminent domain does not depend upon
constitutions but exi'jts independently of them, inherent in
sovereignty, no affirmative declaration of the power was
requisite in the framing of our Merican constitutions. But
to guard against abuse of the power by the sovereign through
its agents, it was felt necessary to embody some limitations
thereof in the fundamental law of the state. The Virginia Rill
of Rights did not contain such a provision nor did any of the
other constitutions of that year which v/erejmodel ed after it.
But the Ilortwest Ordinance had provided for compensation,
and when Illinois in 1B18 first framed a constitution, one
half of the state constitutions then in force contained some
limitation of the power of emjinent domain.
In the first Illinois constitution it was provided that
no man's property should be taken or applied to public use,
without the consent of his representatives in the general
assem^bly, nor 7;ithout just compensation being made to him, which
atill showed the distrust of executive usurpation of pov/er so
strongly experienced by the An-erican colonists in 1776. In
the first draft of the Illinois constitution submitted to the
convention it was provided that com.pensation should be previ ously
made, which condition had not formerly been considered essential
to the Validity of the exercise of the power, at least by the
(1) Chase's Blackstone p. 79.
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(1)
State itaclf. But this augr^eation vian not at that time
adopted.
Nd change Wa3 made in the provi:^icn regarding eminent
domain in the constitution of 1848, but important changes were
made in the present cons^ti tut i on in 1870. In the firyt place,
while it had been the univeroal rule that the compensation
awarded ?7ao to be measured by the value of the property taken
and the direct injury to the ov/ner from the loss, ao that any
proper exercise of the powers of government which did not
directly encroach upon the property of an individual or
disturb hirr. in hia possession or enjoyment would not entitle
him to compensation, it was now provided, for the first time in
any state in the Union, that private property should not be
taken or darnaF,ed for public use without just compensation.
This important innovation was not adopted without consider-
able discussion and some opposition in the convention of 1869,
mainly on the ground that by departing from the settled rules
relating to eminent domain there was no certainty as to where
the courts might stop in the application of thin new provioicn,
resulting perhaps in making it impossible to carry ouf certain
important public inproverient s because of the extent of dam^ages
to be paid to private owners. Rut this eminently just and
reasonable provision was retained and has been copied in a
(2)
number of the state constitutions adopted since that time.
Another important change introduced in the consti tutiorlof
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Lim.i tations . " p. 813.
(2) Ibid p. 810.
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IS'^O with respect to the right of eminent doniair., wan the
provision as to the manner of ascertainins the conpenaation due.
Under the former constitutiono it was left T/ith the le^i .slature
to fix the manner of determining such compensation* What the
tribunal shall be which is to asse33 the compensation, m.uct
be determined either by the constitution or by the statute which
provides for the appropriation, for the exercise of the right
of eminent dom.ain is not one where, as a matter of right, the
(1)
party is entif ed to trial by jury.
But the proceeding being judicial in character, the
party in interest is entitled to h?^ve an impartial tribunal and
the usual rights and privileges which attend judicial investi-
gations, and the Convention of 1863 felt that jury trial was
the best manner of securing such im.partial investigation, in
cases where the richt was not being exercised by the State
(3)
itself. It Was first proposed to provide for an alternative
body of three commissioners, appointed by a court of record, to
ascertain the compensation^which was the miethod of assessing
such compensation under the existing statutes. But this
provision was struck out of the committee report by the conventic||ri,
m.any members of which were in favor of prescribing even more
omi-yiontly the process to be followed in assessing compensation
hy a jury. It was again variously suggested to require compen-
sation to be first made, and several resolutions were introduced
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." p. 817.
(2) This provision was taken from the Constitution of Hew
York 1846, and was found elsewhere only in the consti tution£
of Iowa 1857, Ij^ichi^.^^n 1850, and Oj^io^ 1851
.
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with a view to prohibiting: the deduction of benefits from the
compenaation to be awarded. This latter proposition aroused
much discussion, being re[^arded b y sor.e as essential to a
just exercise of the power of eminent domain, and by others
as itself most unjust and fc^^t unreasonai^i e . The general
expression of sentiment was, however, distinctly in favor of
such a limitation and it was in fact adopted by the convention,
(1)
but upon re-referment to the committee was finally omitted.
Various other resolutions and motions relative to the
right of eminent domain were introduced, there being more
discussion of this section of the Bill of Rights than of any
other, due principally to what were considered the abuses of
this right by the public ser^/ice corporations, especially the
railroads which had of late been making such large use of
the po7/er. But the convention as a whole realised the wisdom
of leaving the natter of detailed regulation of the power to
the legislature, and rejected the more radical suggestions,
one of which went 30 far as to provide that no man should be
(2)
deprived of his property in any case against his consent.
The provision that the f'^e of land taken for railroad
tjfe.ck3 without the consent of the owners thereof should remain
in such owners, subject tojthe use for which it is taken was
(1) Debates of the Convention of 1889 pp.1575 f i .
(3) Debates of the Convention of 1869 p. 429
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al 30 uiiiqus in the conotitution of Illinois. Its purpose v/aa
to prevent private property from being taken and retained by-
railroad corporations and turned to other U3e3 v;hen no longer
needed for the purpose for vYhich it vvaa taken*
It appears, therefore, from the debates of the convention
that this whole question of the right of eminent domain and
its manner of exercise was considered a question of fundamental
importance v/hich had not been sati sfactoriljr dealt with in
the past, and which required further action, but the diversity
of vieivs as to the changes to be made resulted in a great deal
less radical alteration in the v/ording of this important section,
than v7ould have suited many members of the convention.
Since the right of eminent domain exists in every government
independently of constitutional grant, on the ground of necessity;
no legislative bargain in restraint of the complete, continuous
and repeated ex::5rcise of this right is valid or v/ithin the
protection of the obligation of contracts in either the federal
(1)
or state constitutions.
Private property in this connexion has been defined as
that dominion or indefinite right of user and disposition '.vhihh
one may lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects
(3)
generally, to the exclusion of others. Every sgecies of
property which the public needs may require and which government
Cannot lawfully appropriate under any other right is subject
to be seized and appropriated under the right of eminent domain^
(1) Village of Hyde Park , v. Cemetery Association . 119111 .141 (ISqb
(2) I
.
G
.
?
.
R
. Co . V. Commissioners of HiF.hways 161.111.344 (1836)

in fact le^al and equitable righto of every description, excejt
money or those ri^chto in ac*:ion -.vhich can only be available
(1)
7/hen rriade to jjroduce r.oney.
Under the present constitution not only the taking of
private property but ^ the dariaging qs v/ell mu3t be compen-
sated for. Prior to the constitution of 1870, recovery could
be had only for direct physical in;iury to property as by
by overflowing it, depositing materials upon it etc., and so
interference viith the ingress to or egress from property v;a3
not required to be compensated for. But under the neN provision
inlthis state compensation is to be alloived in all cases, v/here
but for some legislative enactment, an action r/ould lie at
(2)
common law, for tort to property.
The question of :vhat constitutes a public use, has frequent
arisen in the courts, but no definite rule can be laid dov/n. The
necessity or expediency of putting private prpperty to a certain
use^ is a question wholly for the legislature, though the
question ^;7hether such use is public or private, will be reviewed
(3)
by the courts. The ordinary functions of government are, of
coursegj clearly public uses but even private undertakings may
embody a public use, as in the case of so-called public service
(4)
or puolic utility corporations.
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." pp.756ff.
(2) Rigney v. Chic:i^;o . 102 111.64.(1382)
(3) Dunliam v. Village of Hyde Park . 75 111. 371 (1874)
(4) Chi car.o R.I, and ^ac . R . n
.
v. Joliet 79 111. 35 (1875)

-57-
The construction of drains, ditches and leveeo by land-
owners for agricultural, sanitary, or nining purposea across
th6 landG of others, especially authorized by constitutional
(1)
provision, is also subject to the conditions irnposed on
the exercise of the right of eminent domain. Sev;era£e and
other ^Yorks necessary for the abatem.ent of public nuisances
(2)
come '//ithin the meaning of a public use whether constructed
by public authorities or byprivate companies.
"Just compensation" means compensation to such amount as
is under all the circumstances a fair and full equivalent
(3)
for the thing taken or a reimbursement for real, as
(4)
distinguished from merely speculative damages.
The requirement of a jury in this section embraces all
i/jthe provisions of section 5 and permits, therefore, a jury of
(5)
six to be authorized in trials before justices of the peace.
HSo also the jury must be one in the selection of which the
(4)
party in interest has had an opportunity to participate.
In general, since the right of eminent doamin, necessary
and undisputed thought it be, is, nevertheless, a compulsion
on the individual to sell his property, nolens volens. it miust
(1) Constitution of Illinois, 1870, Art. IV. Sec. 31.
(2) Jacksonville v. Lambert 63 111. 519 (1872)
(3) Phillips V. Tov7n of Scales .?lound 195 111. 353 (1902)
(4) R . R . Co . V. City of Pontiac . 169 111. 155 (1897)
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not be abused, and in its exercise the limitations prescribed
by the constitution should be strictly observed, and the
statutes passed in pursuance thereof should be strictly cornpli
(1)
'.vi th .
(2)
Section 14.
Ex post facto la'-'/s, that is, retroactive criminal la'-^s
(3)
were considered at aommon lav; al 30 as cruel and unjust. The
principle that all la'^s should be made to commence in future
Was a fundamental principle of sound legisla':ion in England
and has been a basic doctrine of our American conoti tutional
law from the very first. Retroactive laws, whether ex post
facto laws or laws impairing the obligation of contracts,
that is, whether criminal or civil, were ever contrary to the
spirit of our insti tut ions, under which life, liberty and
property are most jealously safeguarded- The Virginia Bill of
Rights, it is true, did not embody a prohibition on such laws,
but the Northwest ordinance had forbidden laws violating
contract rights and the great majority of states had by 1818
adopted such provisions in their constitutions, besides the
provisions on this point in the United States constitution.
(1) Ayer v. City of Chicago . 149 111. S62 (1894)
(2) "ITo ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts, or making any irrevocable grant of special
privileges or immunities shall be passed . "Consti tution
of IlMnois, 1870, Art. II. Section 14.
(3) Chase's Blackstone, p. 10.
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The federal conoti tution, it nuat be remembered, .ct only
forbids 6oncre33 to pa33 _ex pojt facto lav/a, but expreo.ily
forbida the states al 30 to pass either ex pc 3t facto la"'V3 or
laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The insertion of
these provisions, and the same was also true of the state
guarantees of due process after the adoption of amendrr.ent
fourteen of the federal constitution into the first constitution
of Illinois could, therefore, be of effect only in broadening
the protection which the interpretation of the federal provision
b' the United States courts might supply. That is, any state
act vYhich federal courts would consider contrary to either
of these prohibitions as contained in the federal constitutions
would be wholly bad, whether or not the state courts ir.ight
consider it as not violating the identical provision in the
state constitution. On the other hand, ho?;evsr, a state act
sustained by the federal courts as not contrary to these
prohibitions in the federal constitution might still be
invalidated by the state courts as violating their interpretatior
of the same words in the state constitution.
Both of these guarantees wer'=^, however, continued in the
later constitution of Illinois, and adopted in the constitution
ofl870 practically without discussion, being found at that
time also in about two thirds of the other state constitutions.
The prohibition on making any irrevocable grant of special
privileges or immunities, was new in the present constitution
of Illinois, but very little discussion of this provision took
place on the floor of the convention, notwithstanding that it
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(1)
could bo found in only tr;o other constitutions of that time.
The indi 3criminat9 grantinc of valuable franchiaea^ in corporate
chartera made it neceasar-;, under the ruling in the Dartmouth
College ca3e that such charters are contracts, to protect
the public against corrupt or indifferent legislative bodies,
by providing in the fundamental lav/ of the state that such
grants could not be irrevocably made.
In the convention of 1869 it was moved, .Tith a viev7 to
remedying the mistakes of the paot, as well as to providing
protection in the future, that any amendment made to existing
charters of corporations should subject them to future legis-
lation, that is, withdrav/ them from the protection of this
provision, but this motion was not reported out by the committee
to which it
.•/:',s referred.
Ex post facto laws are defined in this state to be those
by which, after an act indiff -rent in itself has been coru-itted,
the legislature declares it to have been a crime and makes it
(2)
punishable, or those v;hich change punishments to the
^ke. (3)prejudice of y^def endant after the commission bf the crime.
The entire deprivation of a remedy on a contract, is a
violation of the protection hereby guaranteed, but tiie modifioati
(1) Kansaa 1857, Ohio, 1851.
(2) Coler v. Madison Go . I 111. 154 (1826)
(3) Johnson v. People 173 111. 131. (18 98)
The meaning and scope cf the federal prohibition on
the passage of ex post facto laws which is directed to
the state legi slatur e^ as well as to the National Congress
was considered at length in the case of Calder v. Bull,
3 Dall. 386.
i
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(1)
or substitution of a remedy ia not, nor ia the changinc of
(2)
the rules of evidence an impairment of a veated right.
Lin-.itation la'vo are not bad even if affecting existing rights,
if a reasonable time is given for the assertion of the right
(3)
before the bar takes effect. The legislature may enact
retrospective statutes to validate invalid contract.-j, or ratify
acts which it might have authorized in the first place, if
(4)
no vested rights "/ill be infringed.
Charters of private corporations are contracts under the
(5)
Illinois constitution as '.veil as the under federal constitution,
and are subject only to a reasonable exercise of the police
pov/er of the state, that is, to the inherent ina].i enable right
to make all reasonable regulations in the interedtB of public
safety, welfare, health and comfort. So even exemption from
(7)
taxation by charter is a contract binding on the state,
although the taxing gower is a fundamental attribute of governmen ;
.
(1) Hewkirk v. Ch apron, 17 111 344. (1856)
(2) Roby V. Chicago . 64 111. 447. (1873)
(3) Bradley v. TightcaP . 201 111.511 (1903)
(4) Scamir-on v. Commercial Co . 6 111. App . 551. (1880)
(5) Bruffet v. Great Western R.n. Co. 25 111. 249 (1861)
(6) Ruggles V. People . 91 111. 856 (1878)
(7) 111. C.R.R. V. Gccdwin. 94 111. 263. (1880)
if
..I
I.
Sections 15 and 16 .
The necessity of having the military in subordination to
the civil power, and the evila of any other relation between
the twoarms of government, had been early felt in Kngland,
and a formal request for remedying the abuses of the military
power was embodied in the Petition of Right of 1628 to Charles
I, in v/hich it was demanded that the soldiers and sailors
quartered on the inhabitants in times of peace be removed, an.i
that the proceedings by martial law instead of 'oy civil lav/
(3)
be suppressed. Again in the Bill of Rights of 1689 Parliament
expressly forbade the raising or keeping 6f a standing army
(3)
within the kingdom in time of peace without its consent.
In the period prior to the Ajuerican Revolution, moreover,
the colonists had suffered their ov;n experience of the evils of
having standing armies quartered upon them, and interfering 7/ith
the regular course of justice, and in the Declaration of
Independence air,ong the oppressions there described, were the
keeping of standing armies in tinies of peace among the coloni its
without the consent of their legislatures, the quartering of
large bodies of armed troops among them, and generally the
(1) "The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power. No soldier shall in tim.e of peace be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; not in time of
War, except in the manner prescribed by law . "Consti tution
of Illinois, 1870, Art. II, Sections 15 and 16.
(2) Stubbs "Select Charters" p. 518 Petition of Right, cap. X.
(3) Ibid , p. 524. Bill of Rights, clause 6.
II
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rendering of the military independent of and ouperior to the
civil power.
The Virginia Bill of Righta, therefore, embodied a
provision forbidding standing 9*433^ in time of peace, and
subordinating the military pcver to the civil pov/er, in all
caseo, as did also most of the other revolutionary constitutions.
Notwithstanding the fact that these provisions '.vere very common
at the time \7hen the first Illinoini constitution '."/as frarr.ed,
no mention of them is contained in that document. But in the
constitution of 1348, follov/ing t: a precedent of all but
three of the t\7enty-eight constitutions then in force, the
section subordinating the military to the civil por/er 7;a3
inserted, and the present prohibition against quartering
soldiers, found also in almost as m.any of the other constitutions
of the time, wao added.
(1)
Section 17.
Though the right of the people in a free government,
peaceably to assemble an:l to petition the government for
redress of grievances, is one which results from the very
nature and structure of its institutions, it via.3 nevertheless
subjected to repeated attacks by the crovm in England. The
right of petition, though no^.v regarded ao a sirnple, primitive
and natural right, Has even as late as the reign of James II,
(l) "The people have the right to assemble in a peacable
manner to consult for the common good, to make knovj-n their
opinions to their representatives, and to apply for
redress of grievances." Constitution of Illinois, 1870,
Art. II Section 17.
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sought to be denied in the famous trial of the oeven biahoprj,
for having attempted to exerci oe this ri ght
,
and ^therein finally
(1^
vindicated b - their acquittal. The Engliah Bill of Rights
of 168S, therefore, after reciting the illegal prosecution of
these petitioners to the crown, declares that it' is the right
of the subject to petition the king, and that all commitments
(2)
and prosecutions for such petitioning are illegal.
This right wa3 generally expressly protected in the early
American constitutions, though Story regard3 it as unnecessary
to be expressl'ir provided for, ^"^^and the e;irlier constitutions
of Illinois guaranteed it in virtual l^r the same terms as
are now found in this section of the present Illinois consti tuti 0(1
(4)
Section 18
»
The English Bill of Rights had declared that the election
(5)
of members of Parliament ought to be free, and this principle
of free and equal elections was again expressly declared in
the first American Bill of Rights about a century later. The
early constitutions in this country, pretty generally followed
the example of Virginia in this regard, and when in 1818 Illinois
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." p. 497.
(2) Stubbs, "Select Charters," p. 523.
(3) Story on the Constitution, Section 1894,
(4) "All elections shall be free and equal."
Constitution of Illinois, 1870, Art. II, Section 18.
(5) Stubbs "Select Charters." p. 535.
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expreaaly c^aranteed the freedom and equality of electiona,
he adopted the practice prevailing in more than half of the
existing atate constitutions.
The provision as found in the early Illinois constitution
Was retained verbatim, both in the constitution of 13^8 and
in the present constitution of 1870. Just v/hat practical
effect '.70uld be given to this section by the Illinois courts
does not appear, but its general purpose, undoubtedly, is to
keep every election free of all influences and surroundings
which minht bear iinproperly upon it, or might impel the electors
to cast their votes otherwise than as their judgments '.Yould
(1)
/fidictate
.
(3)
Section 19.
This general declaration of the protection which should
be found in the law is practically an ejoitome of the theory
of the common law, and \i3.'i formulated in substance as early as
(3)
the thirteenth century, in the Great Charter of English Libertie
Chapter 40 of Magna Charta of King John decl ar es, "v/e will sell
to no man, "/e v/ill deny no man, or defer right or justice,"
asserting a principle r/hich has remained fundamental in the
(1) Cooley "Constitutional Limitations." p 932.
(2) "Every person ought to find a certain remedy in the lav/s
for all injuries and v/rongs '.'/hich he may receive in his
person, property or reputation; he ought to obtain by la'^,
right and justice freely and '^-zithout being obliged to
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and
without delay." Constitution of Illinois, 1870, Art. II,
Section 19.
(3) Stubbs "Select Charters." p. 301.
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Englioh law from that tine to the preaent, and v;hich had been
guaranteed in over half the state constitution:] in force r/hen
Illinoio v.'a3 admitted to the Union.
The statement of this principle in the first Illinois
constitution
-.vas adopted without substantial change in both
of the later constitutions of Illinois and stands in our
present constitution little different from its first annunciation
seven centuries ago.
Under this provision of the constitution every man has
the right to cal"*- upon tb courts to protect hin in his property,,
person and reputation and that too v/ithout reference to r:hether
other persons are also suffering from the same cause.
The right of an elector to have the person who has been
lav/fully elected established in his office is not a right the
violation of which is an injury to his person, property or
reputation within this provision of the constitution, and
Cannot therefore be enforced throurr,h the courts in absence of
(2)
a statute conferring such jurisdiction on til em
»
But a statute requiring a plaintiff to sho:? that he has
paid all taxes, due and assessed on a lot before he can question
the Validity of a tax title is repugnant to this provision of
(3)
the constitution, in that it com.pels him to buy justice.
(1) Wylie V, Elwood, 34 111. App. 244 (1889)
(2) nouglas V. Hutchinson, 183 111. 337 (1B9S)
(3) Reed v. Tyler 56 111. 288 (1870)
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(1)
Section 30
As a fitting conclusion to the foregoing enur:,eration of
the fundanental principles of government, io added this
declaration of the necessity of a frequent recurrence to these
principles, for preserving the blessings of liberty'', Sinilar
declarations were found in oix of the early state constitutions,
and in the first constitution of Illinois, from which the
provision was continued without change in the subsequent
constitutions of the state.
Such, then, are the principles, in their origin,
development, and application V7hich nor; stand as part of the
fundamental la^^/ of this cor.monvireal th ; the re.mltants of a
large number of factors of varying influence and importance.
The manifest qualities of the common law, its no less apparent
defects, the doctrines of political theorists, the necessities
of political exigencies, ancient constitutional principles
and miOdern political developm.ent s, each played some part in
formulating the body of declarations contained in the present
Bill of Rights; an enumeration of individual rights, on the
one hand comprehensive enough to provide an adequate guarantee
of personal liberty, without, on the other hand entering into
undue philosophical speculation or unwise legislative detail
•
(l) "A frequent recurrence to the fundamiental principles of
civil government is absolutely necessary to preserve the
blessings of liberty." Constitution of Illinois, 1870,
Art . II Section 20
.
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